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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
However, the Fourth Circuit's liberal treatment of county actions in
Donohoe may send local land controversies back to the local courts, where
the close factual inquiries of de facto taking cases may be more appropri-
ately examined."
JOHN B. YELLOTr, JR.
VIII. CRIMINAL LAW
Dangerous Special Offenders
In response to public concern that repeat offenders were receiving leni-
ent sentences,' Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act of 19702
(The Act) which provides that a defendant convicted of a felony may
receive a sentence in excess of the normal maximum upon a finding that
he is a "dangerous special offender."' 3 The statute provides that a defen-
dant is "dangerous" if an increased sentence is needed to protect the public
courts may in fact tend to defer to exercises of regulatory powers by local government in the
interest of federalism. See e.g., 567 F.2d at 609"n.15. See also note 44 infra.
44 See generally Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960) (federal courts
should be wary of disturbing federal/state relations through constitutional review of state
action); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927) (state legislatures and city councils are better
qualified to deal with land use controversies than federal courts). See also note 24 supra.
I Two government studies reported in 1969 that most organized crime leaders have long
criminal records, STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL LAws, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY
ON SENTENcINo, reprinted in, 115 CONG. REc. 34390 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SENATE STUDY
ON SENTENCING] (study based on Federal Bureau of Investigation data), and that the majority
of violent crimes are committed by repeat offenders. NATONAL COMaUSSION ON THE CAUSES AND
PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, 90TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT OF COMMssION, reprinted in 115 CONG.
REC. 35546 (1969). The Commission acquired its data from the Victim-Offender Study con-
ducted by the staff of the House Task Force on Individual Acts of Violence and from standard
data of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id.; see F.B.I., UNIFORM CRIPE REPORTS 35 (1968).
Recent F.B.I. data revealed that over 65% of violent crimes involved repeat offenders. F.B.I.,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 42-47 (1975).
A Gallup Poll taken in 1969 reported that seventy-five percent of those interviewed from
a sample of the general population believed that the courts did not deal harshly enough with
criminals. N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1969, § 1, at 47, col. 1; see 116 CONG. REc. 35194 (1970)
(remarks of Rep. Poff). The Senate Study on Sentencing found that two-thirds of those
offenders included in the survey who were members of La Cosa Nostra-organized crime
"families" and who were indicted by the federal government between 1960 and 1969, faced
maximum jail terms of five years or less. SENATE STUDY ON SENTENCING, supra note 1, at 34390.
Fewer than one-fourth of these individuals received the maximum sentences authorized by
statute, while the sentences of sixty-three percent averaged only forty to fifty percent of the
nmximums, and twelve percent received no jail terms at all. Id.; see McClellan, The Organ-
ized Crime Act (S. 30) Or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties? 46 NOTRE DAME LAw.
55, 147 (1970) [hereinafter cited as McClellan].
2 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1001(a), 84 Stat. 948,
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976)).
18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976). Section 3575(b) authorizes the court to sentence a "dangerous
special offender" to an overall term of up to twenty-five years.
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from further criminal conduct.4 A defendant is a "special offender" if he
has been convicted of felonies on two prior occasions, and if less than five
years has elapsed since his release from prison and the commission of his
most recent offense.' In the recent case, United States v. Williamson,I the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the recidiv-
ist provision of the federal dangerous special offender statute.7
Under the Act, the government must petition the court for dangerous
special offender sentencing prior to trial.' The determination of whether a
defendant is a dangerous special offender is made after trial by a judge
sitting without a jury? The defendant is entitled to counsel, 0 compulsory
process," cross-examination, 12 specific factual findings, 3 and appellate
review of this determination. 4 However, the statute permits the sentencing
judge to rely upon hearsay in presentence reports. 5 Furthermore, the gov-
ernment may establish the defendant's dangerous special offender status
by merely a preponderance of the evidence. 6
In Williamson, the defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm
after being convicted of a felony. Prior to trial, the government petitioned
for dangerous special offender sentencing.8 The prosecution relied primar-
ily on Williamson's two prior felony convictions to support its contention
that he was a special offender. 9 Following Williamson's conviction on the
Id. at § 3575(f).
Id. at § 3575(e)(1). A defendant may also qualify as a "special offender" if he is a
professional criminal or has participated in a criminal conspiracy. Id. A defendant is a
professional criminal if he derives a substantial amount of his income from criminal activity.
Id. at § 3575(e)(2). An accused is a participant in a criminal conspiracy if he committed his
most recent felony to further a conspiracy involving three or more other persons. Id. at §
3575(e)(3).
567 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 617.
18 U.S.C. § 3575(a) (1976). To prevent prejudicing the determination of the defendant's
guilt, the petition for dangerous special offender sentencing may not be disclosed to the jury
or presiding judge prior to the defendant's conviction. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. Naws 4007, 4037 [hereinafter cited
as HousE REPoRT]; see United States v. Bailey, 537 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied
sub nom, 429 U.S. 1051 (1977) (increased sentence invalidated when petition disclosed to
presiding judge); cf. United States v. Edwards, 379 F. Supp. 617 (D.C. Fla. 1974) (petition
filed after defendant's conviction not timely).





" 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976). Either the defendant or the United States may appeal an
increased sentence imposed pursuant to § 3575. Id.
11 See id. at § 3575(b). Section 3577 provides that there are no limitations on the type of
information which the judge may consider to assist him in setting an appropriate sentence.
" Id. at § 3575(b).
567 F.2d at 611. 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1) (1976) prohibits the possession of firearms
by a convicted felon.
" 567 F.2d at 612; see note 8 supra.
" 567 F.2d at 614; see text accompanying note 5 supra. The government relied on a 1965
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firearms charge, the district court conducted a hearing on the govern-
ment's petition, and determined that he was a dangerous special offender. 0
The court sentenced Williamson to six years more than the maximum of
two years he would have received absent the determination that he was a
dangerous special offender.2 On appeal, Williamson contended that the
term "dangerous" as used in the dangerous special offender statute was
unconstitutionally vague as a violation of due process," that the district
court erred in determining that he was a recidivist,2 that the dangerous
special offender proceeding involved a new finding of fact which required
the procedural safeguards of a formal trial, 4 and that his eight-year sent-
ence was disproportionately severe.2
The Fourth Circuit rejected Williamson's contention that the term
"dangerous" was overly vague,26 emphasizing that the determination of
dangerousness was implicit in all sentencing decisions. 2 The court rea-
soned.that the dangerous special offender statute simply requires sentenc-
ing judges to consider the likelihood that the defendant will engage in
further criminal conduct if he receives a short sentence.2 Implicit in the
Fourth Circuit's treatment of the vagueness issue was its recognition that
conviction for house-breaking and larceny and a 1972 manslaughter conviction to support its
contention that Williamson was a special offender. Id. The government further contended
that Williamson came within the ambit of 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(1) (1976) because he had
completed serving his sentence for manslaughter less than five years before his firearms
conviction. 567 F.2d at 614. The government alleged that Williamson was dangerous since
he had committed several violent offenses after his release from prison and, as a result, the
maximum two-year sentence for a firearms conviction under § 1202(a)(1) would be insuffi-
cient to protect the public from further criminal conduct by Williamson. Brief for Appellee
at 7, United States v. Williamson, 567 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1977).
.20 567 F.2d at 611.
21 Id. at 616. The penalty for a firearms conviction under 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1)
(1976) is a maximum fine of $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed two years, or both. Id. at
§ 1202.
2 567 F.2d at 613; see text accompanying note 4 supra. Williamson's vagueness challenge
was based on United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 874, 885 (W.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d
123 (8th Cir. 1975). The Duardi court held that § 3575 was unconstitutionally vague because
it failed to establish a definite standard for determining dangerousness. Id. at 886; see U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Duardi court reasoned that the absence of a legally fixed
standard invited discriminatory application because potential defendants would not know
what conduct would bring them within the ambit of the statute. 384 F. Supp. at 886; see Note,
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 4 MICH. J.L. REF. 546, 631 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Organized Crime Control Act].
2 567 F.2d at 614; see text accompanying note 38 infra. Williamson asserted that he was
not a dangerous special offender because he was not a special offender under § 3575(e)(1).
See 567 F.2d at 614.
24 567 F.2d at 614; see text accompanying note 43 infra.
21 567 F.2d at 616. Williamson contended that his eight-year sentence was dispropor-
tionately severe because it was four times the maximum sentence for a firearms possession
conviction. Id. See text accompanying note 49 infra.
2 567 F.2d at 613; see note 22 supra.
2 567 F.2d at 613.
Id., quoting United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
864 (1977).
1979]
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the dangerous special offender statute is applied only after a guilty
verdict.
29
Due process requires the terms of a penal statute to be sufficiently
explicit to provide fair warning of precisely what conduct is prohibited."
The Williamson court, however, held that this requirement is inapplicable
to the dangerous special offender statute because the statute merely in-
creases the penalty for a criminal offense and does not create a new of-
fense.3 The Fourth Circuit apparently adopted the position that the two
requirements of the dangerous special offender statute serve different pur-
poses. The finding that the defendant is a recidivist "special offender"
exposes him to a longer sentence than he would otherwise receive for the
offense charged.3 2 The function of the finding of "dangerousness" is to
determine whether, and to what extent, a sentence in excess of the statuto-
rily prescribed maximum is appropriate. This position is supported by
the parallel which the Williamson court drew between the dangerous spe-
cial offender proceeding and an ordinary sentencing proceeding.34 Since the
dangerous special offender statute does not provide express criteria for
determining whether a defendant poses a danger to society,35 the Fourth
Circuit properly placed this determination within the discretion of the
sentencing judge.
36
21 See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976).
11 See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939); Conally v. General Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 393-95 (1926).
3, 567 F.2d at 614-15; see United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1175-76 (5th Cir.
1977); United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184, 1194-95 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Stewart, 531 F.2d 326, 332 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976).
32 567 F.2d at 614; see note 33 infra.
11 See 567 F.2d at 613-14. In United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir. 1977), the
court noted a significant difference between the type of issue to be decided by the determina-
tion of special offender status under § 3575(e) and the issue decided by the determination of
dangerousness under § 3575(f). 552 F.2d at 1193. While § 3575(e)(1) involves the historical
fact of prior convictions, § 3575(f) involves both evaluation of the defendant's character and
prediction of his future conduct. Since the determination of the defendant's dangerousness
has traditionally been left to the discretion of the sentencing court, the Neary court concluded
that the findings of dangerousness and special offender status serve separate and distinct
functions. Id.
1 567 F.2d at 613 n.7.
3 See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(f) (1976). Rather than providing criteria for predicting future
dangerousness, § 3575(f) merely states that a finding of dangerousness is grounds for in-
creased incarceration under the statute. Id.; see MODEL SENTENCING ACr § 5 (2d ed. 1972);
Comment, Dangerous Special Offenders, 62 IowA L. REv. 1204, 1210 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Dangerous Special Offenders]. The Model Sentencing Act provides that a prediction of
future dangerousness may be based on a defendant's past dangerous conduct and a finding
that he is suffering from a severe mental disorder.
" The Williamson court's treatment of the "dangerousness" issue was consistent with
the approach taken by the Fifth, Seventh and Sixth Circuits. In United States v. Bowdach,
561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977), the Fifth Circuit held that § 3575 was not unconstitutionally
vague. 561 F.2d at 1176. The Bowdach court emphasized that the term "dangerous", as used
in § 3575(f), is a familiar concept in criminal law because district courts must constantly
determine dangerousness when granting, denying or setting bail. Id. at 1175. The Fifth Circuit
noted that the inclusion of the term "dangerous" in § 3575 granted even greater protection
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The Fourth Circuit also' rejected Williamson's contention that the dis-
trict court erred in concluding that he was a recidivist "special offender.
3
Williamson asserted that his 1965 conviction was too remote in time to
indicate repetitious criminal conduct." Although the statute does not limit
the time frame from which convictions may be considered, Williamson
urged the Fourth Circuit to adopt a "ten-year rule" which would exclude
any conviction received more than ten years before the current charge from
consideration in dangerous special offender proceedings. 9 In rejecting this
"ten-year rule," the Williamson court reasoned that a time limit would be
inconsistent with the purpose of the statute to punish repeat offenders who
commit felonies soon after their release from prison. 0 The court reasoned
that the rule proposed by Williamson would prevent courts from imposing
an increased sentence on a defendant who had served more than ten years
on his most recent prison term." The Fourth Circuit also noted that the
requirement that the defendant's most recent offense must have occurred
within five years of his release from prison ensures that the defendant's
criminal conduct is sufficiently repetitious to warrant a finding that he is
a recidivist "special offender.""
Williamson's assertion that the government must prove dangerousness
beyond a reasonable doubt without the use of hearsay evidence assumed
to a defendant since the statute would be constitutional without any explicit dangerousness
requirement. Id. This view assumes that § 3575 does not make "dangerousness" a separate
criminal offense, but rather is directed at the sentencing of defendants who have already been
convicted. See United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326, 334 (6th Cir. 1976). In United States
v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir. 1977), the Seventh Circuit compared the dangerous special
offender proceeding with ordinary sentencing proceedings. Because the potential danger that
a defendant poses to society is a determination inherent in all sentencing decision, the Neary
court concluded that the term "dangerous" in § 3575 was not overly broad or vague. Id. at
1194. In United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1976), the Sixth Circuit held that §
3575 was not unconstitutionally vague, rejecting the district court's reasoning in United
States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Mo. 1974). 531 F.2d at 336; see note 22 supra. The
Stewart court noted that the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the government's
petition for dangerous special offender sentencing in Duardi on the ground that the petition
failed to comply with the requirements of § 3575, 531 F.2d at 336, but emphasized that the
Eighth Circuit did not reach the district court's contention in Duardi that the term
"dangerous" was unconstitutionally vague. Id.; see United States v. Duardi, 529 F.2d 123 (8th
Cir. 1975).
v 567 F.2d at 614.
u Id.
11 Id. The "ten-year rule" advanced by Williamson would exclude a conviction received
more than ten years before the current charge from consideration as one of the defendant's
prior felony offenses under § 3575(e)(1). Id. The suggested ten-year limitation is based upon
FED. R. Evm. 609(b) which sets a ten-year limit on the introduction of evidence of prior
convictions for the purpose of impeaching a witness' testimony. Id.
4 Id.
' Id.
4 Id. The adoption of the five-year limitation amendment in § 3575(e)(1) was suggested
by the American Bar Association because "the judgment of likely recurrence which repeated
criminality permits ... becomes progressively diluted as the time between the present and
the last offense increases." See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 4065; A.B.A. STANDARDS
RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, § 3.3(b)(i) (1967).
1979]
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that the determination of dangerousness was a new finding of fact not an
element of the firearms charge.43 Williamson contended that a defendant
in such a proceeding was entitled to the full range of due process protec-
tions guaranteed in state criminal proceedings." The Fourth Circuit re-
jected Williamson's contention, reasoning that the determination of
whether a defendant is a dangerous special offender involves a "distinct
issue" but does not create a separate criminal charge. 5 The defendant is
not being punished because he is a dangerous special offender; rather, he
is being punished more severely because the finding that he is a dangerous
special offender aggravates his most recent offense." The court concluded
that since a dangerous special offender proceeding is closely analogous to
a normal sentencing proceeding, the procedural and evidentiary safeguards
of a formal trial are unnecessary. 7 Since sentencing should not be confined
to a narrow inquiry into guilt, the Fourth Circuit also reasoned that hear-
say evidence concerning Williamson's character and history was admissi-
ble to aid the judge in setting an appropriate sentence. 8
The Fourth Circuit dismissed Williamson's final argument that in-
creasing his sentence to four times the maximum for the firearms convic-
tion was disproportionately severe, constituting cruel and unusual punish-
'5 Williamson's contention that the dangerous special offender proceeding involved a new
finding of fact which was not an element of the firearms charge was apparently based on
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). In Specht, the Court declared unconstitutional the
Colorado Sex Offenders Act, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 39-19-1 to -10 (1963), which provided for
the imposition of an indeterminate sentence upon a defendant convicted of certain crimes if
a court determined that he either posed a threat of bodily harm to the public or was both a
habitual offender and mentally ill. 386 U.S. at 607; see Cow. REv. STAT. § 39-19-2 (1963).
The Specht Court concluded that due process entitles a defendant in a proceeding under the
Colorado Act to the right to counsel, an opportunity to be heard and to confront adverse
witnesses, the right of cross-examination, an opportunity to offer exculpatory evidence, and
to have findings placed in the record which are adequate to permit a meaningful appellate
review. 386 U.S. at 610.
"1 567 F.2d at 614; see 386 U.S. at 609; Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir.
1966) (defendant entitled to procedural protections at hearing under Pennsylvania sex offend-
ers statute).
567 F.2d at 614-15, citing United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 1976).
'5 See Hearings on the Organized Crime Control Act Before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (letter from Department of Justice), reprinted in
[19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4059, 4069-70; McClellan, supra note 1, at 164. Courts
upholding the constitutionality of state recidivist statutes have reasoned that the defendant's
prior convictions aggravate the commission of his most recent offense. See Gryger v. Burke,
334 U.S. 728 (1948) (recidivist statute not violative of double jeopardy prohibition); Graham
v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912) (recidivist statutes do not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment). Although § 3575(b) requires an additional finding of dangerousness, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that sentencing under the recidivist "special offender" provisions was analo-
gous to sentencing under state recidivist statutes. See 567 F.2d at 616.
11 Id. at 615.
18 Id.; see Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-52 (1949). In Williams, the Court
upheld the use of hearsay in presentence reports. 337 U.S. at 249-50. Because much informa-
tion about a defendant's character and personal history would be inadmissible under formal
evidentiary rules, the Supreme Court held that the formal rules of evidence do not apply to
sentencing proceedings. Id. at 250-52; see 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976); note 15 supra.
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ment.11 The court emphasized that Williamson's propensity for violent
crime was established at the sentencing hearing. As a result, the eight-year
sentence was justified by the need to protect the public from further crimi-
nal conduct."
The language and legislative history of the dangerous special offender
statute clearly support the Williamson rulings. There is no indication that
Congress considered limiting the time frame in which the defendant's pre-
vious convictions could be considered for purposes of determining special
offender status." Thus, the court correctly refrained from adopting the
"ten-year rule" urged by Williamson." The Fourth Circuit properly con-
cluded that Williamson's eight-year sentence represented a penalty for his
firearms offense rather than a punishment for being a dangerous special
offender. 3 The dangerous special offender statute explicitly provides that
,1 567 F.2d at 616; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974), the Fourth Circuit held that the mandatory life
sentence imposed by the West Virginia recidivist statute, W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1966), was
so severe in relation to the nature of the defendant's offenses that it constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. 483 F.2d at 142-43. This approach focuses on the excessiveness of the
punishment relative to the offense, rather than on the nature of the punishment. See Fourth
Circuit Review, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 61, 223 (1974); Comment, Recidivist Statutes, 1974
WASH. U.L.Q. 147, 149 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Recidivist Statutes]. In Coiner, the
defendant had been previously convicted of passing a bad check for $50, transporting forged
clhecks and committing perjury at the murder trial of his son. 483 F.2d at 138. The Fourth
Circuit concluded that the defendant's sentence was disproportionately severe, relying on the
nature of the offense itself, the legislative purpose behind the punishment, and a comparison
with the punishment authorized in other jurisdictions. Id. at 140-43. In Williamson, the court
relied on these same factors in reviewing Williamson's sentence. 567 F.2d at 616. However,
the court only discussed the nature of Williamson's prior offenses which also would have
supported the conclusion that Williamson was dangerous. Id. The Williamson court appar-
ently reasoned that state recidivist statutes could be used as a yardstick to measure the
sentence under § 3575. The court concluded that Williamson's sentence was not cruel and
unusual punishment because it was less severe than the sentences authorized by states'
statutes. 567 F.2d at 617; see e.g., COLO. Rav. STAT. § 16-13-101 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:85-12 (West 1969); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 70.10 (McKinney 1975); WASH. REv. CODE § 9.92
090 (1970). Historically, state recidivist statutes have been held constitutional, surviving
challenges based on the due process, equal protection, privileges and immunities, double
jeopardy and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1;
amend. V; amend. XIV, § 1. See generally Recidivist Statutes, supra at 148. Recidivist
statutes have generally withstood challenges based on the eighth amendment's proscription
of cruel and unusual punishment. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912); McDonald
v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Cooper v. United States, 114 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); Bennett v. State, 455 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); State v. Fisher, 123 W. Va.
745, 18 S.E.2d 649 (1941).
567 F.2d at 616.
s' See HousE REPORT, supra note 8.
52 Since the language of § 3575 is plain and unambiguous and makes no mention of a
limitation on the time frame in which the defendant's previous convictions may be consid-
ered, the Fourth Circuit was proper in enforcing the statute according to its obvious meaning.
See Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479, 490 (1943); Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976).
1 The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee specifically stated that only circum-
stances of aggravation of the defendant's most recent offense are before the court in a § 3575
1979]
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the increased sentence cannot be "disproportionate in severity to the maxi-
mum term otherwise authorized for such felony."54 By tying the defen-
dant's sentence to the maximum authorized for his most recent offense,
Congress apparently attempted to insure that the defendant's sentence
represented a penalty for the crime charged rather than a penalty for being
a dangerous special offender."
The due process protections of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
exclusion of hearsay are not relevant to dangerous special offender sentenc-
ing even if the dangerous special offender statute involves a new finding
of fact.5 A recent Supreme Court holding suggests that due process does
not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt at sentencing. 57 Because due
proceeding. S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 92-93, 163-64 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as SENATE REPORT]; McClellan, supra note 1, at 165.
18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976).
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the finding of dangerous special offender status
aggravates the defendant's present offense is consistent with the approach taken by the Sixth
Circuit. In United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1976), the defendant was charged
with assisting in the escape from jail of a codefendant in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 752(a) (1976).
531 F.2d at 327. The district court rejected the government's dangerous special offender
petition on the ground that"§ 3575 was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 330; see note 22 supra.
Since the Supreme Court had held that the determination of habitual offender status under
traditional recidivist statutes did not relate to a separate criminal charge, Gryger v. Burke,
334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1942); McDonald
v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 312 (1901), the Sixth Circuit concluded that § 3575 did not
create a separate charge either. Id. at 332; see note 46 supra. The Williamson court explicitly
adopted the reasoning of the Stewart court. 567 F.2d at 614-15.
11 The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Williamson was still consistent with Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), because § 3575 incorporates all of the due process safeguards
specifically required by Specht. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976); see note 43 supra.
11 In Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), the Supreme Court reversed the imposition
of the death penalty on the defendant because the trial judge's decision had been based partly
on information contained in a presentence report which had not been disclosed to the defen-
dant. 430 U.S. at 351. Although Gardner held that the due process clause applied at sentenc-
ing, the Court stated that due process did not require full criminal procedural rights at
sentencing. Id. at 358. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), the Court required the
government to prove all essential elements of the murder charge beyond a reasonable doubt,
including absence of the defense that the defendant acted in the heat of passion. Id. at 703-
04. Some commentators have interpreted Mullaney as requiring proof of any fact affecting
the degree of criminal culpability beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Note, Affirmative
Defenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur: New York's Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 43
BROOKLYN L. REv. 171 (1976); Comment, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v.
Wilbur and the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 390 (1976); Note,
Affirmative Defenses in Ohio After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 36 OHio ST. L.J. 828 (1975). In
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), however, the Court stated that Mullaney should
not be read so broadly. 432 U.S. at 214-15.
In United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir. 1977) the Seventh Circuit suggested
that the § 3575 preponderance of the evidence standard may be constitutionally inadequate
because the proof of prior convictions constitutes a finding of fact which increases the defen-
dant's culpability. 552 F.2d at 1193. However, the court apparently relied on the interpreta-
tion commentators had given to Mullaney prior to Specht. In a recent case, United States v.
Inindino, 47 U.S.L.W. 2278 (N.D. Ill. 1978), the federal district court held that § 3575 involves
a post-conviction proceeding at which the reasonable doubt standard does not apply. Id.; see
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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process is a flexible concept," hearsay contained in presentence reports
should not be excluded automatically from consideration in a dangerous
special offender proceeding despite the defendant's inability to cross-
examine those who prepared the reports. 9 Due process only requires that
the procedural protections meet the demands of the particular situation.60
The inquiry into the necessity of cross-examination should focus on the
significance of cross-examination to truth finding in the context of resolv-
ing particular factual issues." In a dangerous special offender proceeding,
the defendant has already been convicted of a crime and is almost certain
to be incarcerated. The inquiry is not limited to deciding whether or not
the defendant committed a particular act, but rather, to whether he is
dangerous.62 This determination can be made most effectively when the
sentencing judge is free to consider all information, both hearsay and non-
hearsay, relating to the defendant's character and personal history.,
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Williamson strengthens the constitu-
tional foundation for imposing increased sentences pursuant to the recidiv-
ist provisions of the dangerous special offender statute. This does not
mean, however, that all increased sentences imposed pursuant to the dan-
gerous special offender statute will be free from constitutional challenge
in the Fourth Circuit. 4 The statute may not be immune from challenge on
different grounds than those presented in Williamson. Constitutional chal-
lenges may still be raised regarding the improper application of the provi-
sions of the dangerous special offender statute in a particular case.65
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Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). In Morrissey, the Supreme Court out-
lined the due process protections required at a parole revocation hearing, specifically rejecting
the approach of Specht that the defendant must be afforded the "full panoply" of procedural
protections of a formal trial. 408 U.S. at 489; see note 43 supra.
11 The unavailability of witnesses who have prepared presentence reports raises an issue
of the constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses. The presetitence report is hearsay
evidence, relied upon by the sentencing court without affording the defendant an opportunity
to cross-examine the sources of information utilized in the report. See Uelman, Proof of
Aggravation Under the California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act: The Constitutional
Issues, 10 Loy. L.A. L. Rnv. 725, 739 (1977).
60 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
61 See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
89 (1970).
8 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976); see note 33 supra.
567 F.2d at 615.
' The application of the non-recidivist provisions of § 3575, see note 5 supra, may
engender constitutional issues different from those present in the Williamson case. The deter-
mination that a defendant is a professional criminal or a participant in a conspiracy involves
a more complex adjudication of guilt or criminal tendencies than the determination that the
defendant is a repeat offender. See generally United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160 (5th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Mo. 1974). The complexity of a
non-recidivist dangerous special offender proceeding may demand greater procedural safe-
guards than those present in a recidivist proceeding under § 3575. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976).
11 See SENATE RE'oRT, supra note 53, at 92 (1969); McClellan, supra note 1, at 165 (1970).
An increased sentence imposed pursuant to § 3575 is only constitutional when the court
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